Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court by Sunstein, Cass Robert
 
Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the
Supreme Court, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1179 (1996).
Published Version http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol84/iss4
/7/
Accessed February 16, 2015 1:52:35 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12921737
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAACalifornia Law Review
Volume 84|Issue 4 Article 7
July 1996
Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the
Supreme Court
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the California Law Review at Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Law Review by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
jcera@law.berkeley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein,Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1179 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol84/iss4/7Public Deliberation, Affirmative
Action,  and the Supreme Court
Cass R. Sunsteint
INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I make  a simple and  somewhat  impressionistic  argu-
ment.  I start with  the  suggestion  that  the  issue  of  affirmative  action
should be settled  democratically,  not judicially.  Certainly  the Supreme
Court  should  not  invalidate  most  race-conscious  remedial  programs.
But until recently, there has been little or no sustained democratic  delib-
eration  on  the issue.  The  citizenry's  ambivalence  about-or  hostility
toward-affirmative  action has been expressed mostly in private and not
in  public  arenas.  The  enormous  diversity  of  affirmative  action  pro-
grams, not to mention  the separable  justifications  for and  variable effi-
cacy  of each program,  has  not received  much  public  attention.  Some
programs work well; some do not; and neither empirical  data nor  public
judgments about their content  and value have been reflected  in program
design.
In  these  circumstances,  the  Supreme  Court's  apparently  odd  be-
havior-its meandering  course, its refusal to issue rules-in the  affirma-
tive action context  might be defended as performing  a valuable catalytic
function.  The  Court's  willingness  to hear  a number  of affirmative  ac-
tion  cases, and  its complex,  rule-free,  highly  casuistical'  opinions,  have
had  the salutary  consequence  of helping  to  stimulate  public  processes
and directing the citizenry  toward  open  discussion  of underlying  ques-
tions of policy and principle.  In these ways,  the Court's  route  has been
far preferable  to the  most  obvious  alternatives:  validation  or  invalida-
tion  of  most  affirmative  action  programs  pursuant  to  clear  doctrinal
categories.
Copyright Q 1996 California Law Review,  Inc.
t  Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service  Professor of Jurisprudence,  University of Chicago
Law School  and Department of Political Science.
1.  By "casuistry,"  I mean decision by reference to the  details  of particular  cases,  rather  than
by reference to rules or theories.  See generally  ALBERT R.  JONSEN  AND  STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE
ABUSE  OF CASUISTRY  (1988).
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That, in a nutshell,  is the  argument  to follow.2  I do  not claim  that
the Court has  always  been  self-conscious  about the virtues  of  casuistry
thus  described.  But if the point  is correct,  it bears  a great  deal  on  the
relations  between  the Court  and  a  well-functioning  system  of  political
deliberation.  It connects,  for example,  to  current  debates  about  the re-
lationship  between  the Constitution  and  discrimination  on  the  basis  of
sexual orientation; here too, the Court might use  a casuistical  method  to
spur public  discussion.  There  are,  however,  serious  questions  about
whether current public  processes  are sufficiently  deliberative, especially
in the area of affirmative  action.
I
SOCIAL NORMS  AND PUBLIC DEBATE
People often  think one thing but say  another, because of the effects
of social pressures and social norms on what can be said in public?  For
example, in most contemporary  American circles, a  strong  social  stigma
against  anti-Semitic  statements  exists;  people  who  think  anti-Semitic
things are unlikely to make such  statements  on television  or  in  a public
debate.  In  many groups  where  religious  convictions  are  both  deep  and
widespread,  people cannot confess  their uncertainty  about  whether  God
exists;  they  may  attend  church  regularly  despite  their  doubts  on  that
score.  In  other places, people cannot  acknowledge  that they  are  deeply
religious; in such places,  social  norms  punish  public  declarations  of re-
ligious convictions  The  general  point  is simple:  social  norms  drive a
wedge between public statements  and private  beliefs,  hopes,  and  convic-
tions.
From  this  point, it emerges  that "political  correctness"  is no  iso-
lated phenomenon limited  to  left-leaning  intellectuals.  It is a pervasive
fact  of  social  life.  It  appears  whenever  prevailing  norms  discourage
people from taking issue with a widely held  social  belief.  Those  inter-
ested in democratic  politics should notice the omnipresent role  of public
constraints  on public statements.
Is the existence  of such constraints  something  to be lamented?  No
simple answer would make  sense.  Sometimes, by imposing sanctions  on
2.  For a similar argument, see  Paul J. Mishkin,  The  Uses of Ambivalence:  Reflections on the
Supreme  Court and the  Constitutionality of Affirmative  Action,  131  U.  PA.  L  REV.  907  (1983)
(discussing lack of congruence between the Supreme Court's methods  and results in their affirmative
action  cases).  The  argument  is  generalized  in  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Foreword: Leaving  Things
Undecided, 110 Hzv.  L. REV.  (forthcoming Nov. 1996).
3.  An  outstanding  discussion  of such  "preference  falsification"  is TmUaR  KuRAN,  PRIVATE
TRUTHS,  PUBLIc  LIES (1995),  which  includes a section  on affirmative  action  at  138-41.  I  do  not
mean to endorse all of what  Kuran  says  on that score.  See Cass  R. Sunstein,  True Lies, THE  NEw
REPUBLIC,  December 25,  1995, at 37-41 (reviewing Kuran's book).
4.  This is a concern in STEPHEN  L CARTER,  THE CULTURE  or DISBELIEF  (1993).
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vicious  or  invidious  judgments,  social  norms  have  a  healthy
"laundering  effect."5  The existence of social  sanctions can  make  peo-
ple  embarrassed  about  those judgments  and  eventually  make  them  re-
cede  or even disappear.  If "[h]ypocrisy  is the homage that vice  pays  to
virtue,"6 then social norms can identify both vice and virtue  as such,  and
enable  citizens  to  tell  which  is  which.  Hypocrisy  can  therefore  have
valuable social uses.  It has a civilizing effect.!  It can produce  justice by
making unjust behavior seem vicious or otherwise unacceptable.
On  the other hand,  social norms  of the kind  I  am  discussing  can
cause  damage  in  two  different  ways.  First, they  may  prevent  people
from  offering  arguments  that are  productive, reasonable,  or  even right.
If prevailing norms  are invidious or rooted in confusion,  they  may  even
perpetuate  invidious or confused  practices.  Consider the many  areas  in
the  world  where  social  norms  strongly  discourage  advocacy  of  sex
equality;8 many  women who indicate  their belief in equality  run  enor-
mous  risks.  Second,  social  norms  may  discourage  the  expression  of
doubt,  even when doubt  exists and  when  debate  is, partly  for that  very
reason,  desirable  and  potentially  productive.  In  that  way,  prevailing
norms  can damage processes  of public  deliberation.  Even if prevailing
norms  are  not  invidious  on  their  merits-even  if  they  reflect  clear
thinking  or  hard  won wisdom-their  effects  can  be  pernicious  when
they impair public deliberation.  In  a well-functioning  democracy,  facts
and  options  are  clarified  through  doubt,  and  people  have  a  sense  of
what their fellow citizens think..
Of course,  a certain  suppression  of issues and opinions  stems from
practical necessities.  Not everything  can be discussed  at once.  At any
time, many things must be taken for granted.  Some  things  are  properly
taken as so  obvious that they  "go without saying."  But in  many  areas,
one  can  safely  say that democratic  processes  would  be better  if public
debate focused  on what really concerns  people.
From  the  standpoint  of  both  law  and  democratic  theory,  a  great
deal needs to be done on this  important topic.  We do  not know the ex-
tent to which  actual  private judgments  are not expressed  publicly,  even
when  they are quite  widespread, and  when the reason  for  silence  is that
5.  See  Robert  E. Goodin,  Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  CHOICE
THEORY 75 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds.,  1986).
6.  Frangois,  Duo  de La  LaRouChefoucauld,  REFLECTIONS;  OR  SENTENCES  AND  MORAL
MAXIMS,  Maxim 218 (1678),  quoted in JOHN  BARTLETT,  FAMILIAR  QUOTATIONS  65  (Justin Kaplan
ed.,  16th ed.  1992).
7.  See Jon Elster, Strategic  Uses of  Argument, in BARRERS TO CONFLICT  RESOLUTION 237-50
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
8.  See UNITED  NATIONS  DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAM,  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  REPORT  1995, at
105-08.
9.  This  is, of  course,  a standard  Millian  point.  See  JOHN  S.  MILL,  ON  LIBERTY  ch.  2
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing 1978)  (1859).
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social norms  impose sanctions  on  the  public  expression  of those judg-
ments.  It is therefore  important  to take  account  of possible  disparities
between what is  said and  what is thought.  It is also  important  to  know
how wide such disparities  are, whether the  disparities  reflect  biases, and
whether  some  social  institutions  or practices  facilitate  or  inhibit  open
discussion.
II
THE  SUPREME  COURT  AS  CATALYST
It seems obvious  to  say  that when the Supreme  Court  faces a con-
stitutional attack on a law, it has three basic  options:  it might uphold the
law, it might invalidate the law, or it might refuse to  address  the issue by
denying  certiorari  or by  taking  advantage  of  various  avoidance  strate-
gies.
A detailed  literature discusses  the third  and  least  obvious  of  these
options.'0  On  a familiar  view, the Court  should  often  permit  issues  to
"percolate"  in lower courts  and  in the nation as a  whole.  Through  this
route, it can allow many forms  of legal  and  political  discussion  and  de-
bate;  in  that  way,  the Court  avoids  premature  judicial  foreclosure  of
hard questions.  The Court might take  this route for  practical  reasons  or
for reasons  of principle.  Perhaps  a firm  judicial  resolution  would  be
poorly received  by  the community."  Surely this point bears  on possible
judicial  foreclosure  of  affirmative  action  programs,  say,  twenty-five
years  ago.  Perhaps  a judicial  resolution  would  disserve  the very  cause
that the Court  is seeking  to  promote.  This  point  has  been  vigorously
urged in  the context of abortion,  where  (it is said)  the Court's  early ju-
dicial  decision  in Roe  v.  Wade2  helped  undermine  the  movement  for
sex  equality. 3  Certainly judicial  decisions  can  have  unintended  social
consequences,  and  this practical  point  argues  in  favor  of judicial  cau-
tion.  The Court  might  also avoid  premature  foreclosure  because  of its
own humility.  The  Court might  lack  relevant information  and  wait  to
see how a certain practice works  out  in  reality.  Or the Court  might  be-
lieve that certain  issues are difficult from the standpoint  of (legally  rele-
vant) morality and therefore, in principle, it is important  to  ensure that  a
good deal  of public  deliberation  occurs before the Court acts.
These are important points,  and as we will see they bear a great  deal
on the issues raised  by  affirmative  action.  But the Court  actually  has  a
10.  See  generally ALEXANDER  M.  BICKEL,  THE  LBAST  DANGEROUS  BRANCH  ch.  4  (1962)
(discussing the Supreme Court's practice to withhold exercise of power of judical review).
11.  See  generally GERALD  N.  ROSENBERG,  THE  HOLLOW  HOPE  (1991)  (describing  a  Court
"constrained"  by various social and cultural conditions,  including public opinion).
12.  410U.S.  113 (1973).
13.  ROSENBERG,  supra  note 11,  at 339  (noting that "reliance  on  the Court seriously  weakened
the political efficacy of pro-choice forces").
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fourth option:  it can issue a highly casuistical decision,  one that resolves
little beyond  the single case, but that  operates  as  a catalyst for public
discussion.  By assuming jurisdiction,  by  offering  a ruling,  but by  issu-
ing  a  ruling  that  is  case-specific  and  along  crucial  dimensions  not
authoritative  for  the  future,  it can  call  public  attention  to  a  problem
without foreclosing  public judgment.  This  fourth  option  is  especially
appropriate  when the  Court  is uncertain  about  whether  general  rules
would  be satisfactory,  and  when  it believes that differences  of fact  and
content are highly relevant  to constitutional  outcomes.
There  is, of course, a large  debate  within the Court  and  within the
scholarly  community  about  the virtues  of case-by-case  particularism. 4
Defenders  of  particularism  often  speak  of the  need  to  proceed  cau-
tiously  in the midst  of ignorance  about  issues  not before  the Court.15
But particularism  also has  a democratic  function,  and  this  is  so  in  two
different ways.  Judicial  particularists  can promote democratic  virtues  of
participation  and  responsiveness,  by  ensuring  that people  are  not fore-
closed  by  rulings  involving previous  litigants  who  have  somewhat  dif-
ferent  complaints.  The  process  of judicial  particularism  allows  each
person to have a day in court, invoking the distinctive  features  of his  or
her  case. 6  But  there  is  an  independent  point.  Particularist  decisions
allow people, through democratic processes,  to continue to debate issues,
secure  in the knowledge  that courts have not attempted  to have  a final
say.  In  this  respect,  case-specific  judgments  operate  as  a  kind  of
"remand"  to the public  for  further  proceedings,  at  least  in  the  sense
that they  do  not foreclose  those  proceedings  and  may  even  spur  them
through  the visibility of court decisions.
In administrative law, a remand  to the agency  for  further proceed-
ings  is  an  exceedingly  common  phenomenon. 17  In  the  remand,  the
agency is permitted to do as it originally did, but it must offer a new and
better justification.  The court's decision  is case-specific;  it can easily  be
"distinguished"  by  a resourceful  administrator,  even on the same  set of
facts.  Much  debate  exists  over whether this process  generally  tends  to
14.  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm.  L  REV.  1175 (1989);
Kathleen  M.  Sullivan,  The  Supreme  Court, 1991  Term-Foreword:  The  Justices of Rules  and
Standards, 106 HA.v. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems  With Rules,  83  CALIF.  L  REV.
953 (1995).
15.  See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481  (1994)  (O'Connor, J.,  concurring)  (arguing
that the Court's opinion does not apply the Establishment Clause test set forth in earlier line of cases).
16.  See EDWARD  H. LEVI,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO LEGAL  REASONING  2-6 (1949).
17.  See, e.g.,  Motor Vehicle  Mfrs.  Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,  463  U.S.  29,  57
(1983)  (remanding to the National  Highway Traffic  Safety  Administration for  further  consideration
of decision  to rescind  the passive  restraint requirement);  Industrial  Union Dep't v. Am.  Petroleum
Inst.,  448  U.S.  607,  671  (1980)  (remanding  to  Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Administration  to
reconsider the permissible exposure limit established for benzene).
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work out  well. 8  But when  it does, the  remand  promotes  better public
deliberation by drawing  attention  to difficulties  that had not yet received
adequate attention,  and by helping  to produce better processes  of delib-
eration  for the future."'
Much  of constitutional  law has  a structure  similar  to  the  adminis-
trative law remand.'0  Sometimes  the Court  effectively  "remands"  issues
for fresh  deliberation.2  Many  of  the  modem  privacy  cases  involving
sexual  autonomy  can  be understood  accordingly.'  In these  cases,  the
state defended laws restricting  availability of contraception  by  reference
to the goal of preventing premarital  or extramarital  activity.  The  Court
did  not deny  that the  state has  a legitimate  interest  in  preventing  non-
marital sexual activity.  We do not say that a law directly  punishing  such
activity  is unconstitutional.  But, the  state may  not  attempt  to  promote
the underlying  interest through  the indirect means of preventing  contra-
ception.  If  the  state is  genuinely  interested  in  preventing  nonmarital
sexual relations, it must pursue  that policy  in  a way that receives  mean-
ingful  democratic  scrutiny  and  reflects  actual  democratic  approval  of
the underlying judgment of policy  and  principle-through  the criminal
sanction.  The  more  indirect  and  discriminatory  route  of  preventing
contraception  is an  unacceptable  means  of  pursuing  the  relevant  end.
Because  of its indirection,  a ban  on  contraceptives  does  not  accurately
reflect a democratic judgment against extramarital relations.  In  fact, no
such judgment  followed  the Court's  cases  because  the  public  was  un-
willing to use the criminal  sanction  to  punish  extramarital  relations  di-
rectly.
18.  See Joseph L.  Sax,  The  (Unhappy)  Truth About NEPA,  26  OKLA.  L  REV.  239  (1973)
(suggesting that there is  "no  solid evidence  to support the belief that requiring articulation,  detailed
findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety  of... administrative decisions");  cf.
Peter  H.  Schuck  & E. Donald  Elliott,  To  the  Chevron  Station: An  Empirical Study  of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE  LJ.  984, 1059  (1991)  (reporting  that their original  hypothesis  that
agencies  would seek  ways  to reaffirm  their decisions  on  remand  "was  not borne  out,"  and  that in
approximately  40%  of  remands,  the  agencies  made  major  changes  "primarily  because  of  the
remand")  (emphasis in original).
19.  See William F. Pedersen, Jr.,  Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85  YALE  LJ.  38,
59-60 (1975).
20.  See  ROBERT  A.  BURT,  THE  CONSTITUTION  IN  CONFLICT (1992);  Guido  Calabresi,
Antidiscrimination  and Constitutional  Accountability (What  the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
H,  tv. L. R.v.  80 (1991).
21.  See Alexander  M. Bickel & Harry  H.  Wellington,  Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process:  the Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV.  L. REV.  1 (1957).
22.  See  Carey  v.  Population  Servs.  Int'l,  431  U.S.  678  (1977)  (holding  that  access  to
contraceptives  is essential to the exercise  of a  fundamental  right  to  procreation  and  is  therefore
consitutionally  protected); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438  (1972) (finding statute permitting married
persons,  but  not  single persons,  to  obtain  contraceptives  violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause);
Griswold v. Connecticut,  381 U.S. 479 (1965)  (holding a statute  forbidding  the use of contraceptives
as unconstitutional  because it violated the right of marital privacy).
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This  is a controversial  account  of the  privacy  cases.  But it helps
make sense of rulings  that are  otherwise very  puzzling.  And  at the very
least, it suggests the possibility of a judicial role in catalyzing  public  de-
bate through  narrow  rulings designed  to focus public  attention  on  the
more fundamental  questions.
mi
THE  AFFRMATIVE  ACTION MUDDLE
It is easy to be skeptical about the Supreme  Court's  affirmative  ac-
tion cases.  From the standpoint of the rule of law, the cases  are  truly  a
mess.  This  was so from the  very  start.  In Regents of the  University of
California  v. Bakke,'  the Court  was badly  divided  and  could  not  pro-
duce a majority  opinion.  Of course, the  often-criticized  "rule"  of the
case was that universities may use race  "as  a factor"  in admissions, but
may  not create  quotas.'  While  this  rule  has  played  a  crucial  role  in
American  society and  American  debate,  it represented  the  view of  Jus-
tice Powell  alone.  The  other  eight  participating  justices  explicitly  re-
jected that rule.  Ironically,  the  case stands for a proposition  that  only
one justice thought sensible.
Bakke  was  not  an  auspicious  beginning  for  those  seeking  clear
rules.  The Court's second affirmative  action case, Fullilove v.  Klutznick,
compounded  the  problem.'s  In  that  case,  no  majority  spoke  for  the
Court, no  standard  of review  was  selected  for  affirmative  action  cases,
and by the plurality's  own admission, its decision  was highly  dependent
on the facts of the particular case.'  In another case with slightly  differ-
ent  facts,  the  outcome  might  be  different.27  Remarkably,  during  the
next nine  years,  the Court's  decisions  developed  no  clear  standard  of
review and  seemed  to turn  not  on  rules,  but  instead  on  a  large  set  of
factors:
-whether  official findings  of past discrimination  had been made;'
-whether  the relevant program was rigid or flexible; 29
-whether  the relevant program operated  as a quota; 0
23.  438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24.  U.  at 272.
25.  448 U.S.  448 (1980)  (upholding a federal law requiring  that  10% of federal  funds  granted
for local public works be used by minority-owned  businesses).
26.  Id. at 486.
27.  Id. (noting that a different outcome might have been reached,  for  example,  if the program
had excluded an identifiable minority group that had been the victim of a degree of disadvantage  and
discrimination equal to or greater than  that suffered by the groups encompassed in the program).
28.  Wvygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986)  (requiring an  official  finding
of past discrimination by the government  department involved  before  racial  classifications  can  be
used to remedy discrimination).
29.  Fullilove,  448 U.S. at 490.
30.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18  (Powell,  J.).
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-whether  the relevant program  had  been  issued  by  Congress,  by
another  politically  accountable  body,  by  a court,  or by  some other  in-
stitution;
31
-whether  innocent victims were injured,  and if so in a severe way;3 2
-and  more."
The use  of these numerous  factors  led  to  surprising  decisions  in  par-
ticular cases,  and  outcomes  were  hard to predict  in  advance.  Notably,
some of these factors relate  to the nature  of the deliberative  process  it-
self.  The relevant cases received a good deal of public  attention, but the
constitutional  position  of  affirmative  action  programs  remained  quite
obscure 4
It was not until 1989 that the Court  finally  settled  on  a standard  of
review.  In  City of Richmond  v.  J.A.  Croson Co., 35  a plurality  of  the
Court held that affirmative  action  programs  would be subject  to  "strict
scrutiny,"  at least if they  had  not been  enacted  by  the  federal  govern-
ment. 36   But even  while announcing  a  standard  of  review,  it  did  so  in
such  a way as  to  leave the law exceptionally  obscure,  and  to  leave  the
many  decisions  that preceded  Croson in  an  uncertain  state.37  Hence,
Croson did not reject the Court's casuistical  approach  to  affirmative  ac-
tion.  And  in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,3
1  when  the  Court  fi-
nally  announced  that the  same  standard  of review applied  to  the nation
31.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480.
32.  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83.
33.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v. Paradise,  480  U.S.  149  (1987)  (considering  whether  a  race-
conscious  promotion system is narrowly  tailored);  Sheet  Metal  Workers  v.  EEOC,  478  U.S.  421
(1986)  (approving affirmative action program for a union with a  history of continued  and  egregious
racial discrimination).
34.  The  legitimacy  of affirmative  action  in  the  statutory  context  is  more  clear.  United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.  193, 208  (1979), held  that Title VII  does  not ban  voluntary
race-conscious  actions by an employer.  I believe that the best argument for  this result is consistent
with  the  democracy-reinforcing  concerns  traced  in  this  essay.  In  1964,  Congress  made  no
considered judgment that affirmative action programs were unlawful.  When it spoke in terms  of race
neutrality, it was  thinking  not of remedial  programs,  but  of  discrimination  based  on  malice.  See
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S.  616 (1987)  (holding that Title VII forbids discrimination  against
whites  at least if it is  not part of an  affirmative  action program).  In  the  absence  of a  considered
judgment by  Congress, the  Court should  not  ban  voluntary  programs  of  this kind.  See  CASS  R.
SUNSTEIN,  LEGAL REASONING  AND  POLITICAL  CONFLICT  ch. 4 (1995).
35.  488 U.S. 469 (1989).
36.  Id. at 493-98  (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion).
37.  Compare Joint Statement:  Constitutional  Scholars' Statement on Affirmative  Action After
City of Richmond  v.  J.A.  Croson  Co.,  98  YALE  L.J.  1711  (1989)  (presenting  the  view  of  thirty
constitutional  scholars  that  carefully  designed  race-conscious  remedies  of  state  and  local
governments  are not necessarily unconstitutional), with Charles Fried, Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond  v. J.A. Croson  Co.:  A  Response  to  the Scholars'  Statement, 99  YALE  L.J.  155  (1989)
(arguing that the Scholars'  Statement is misleading because  Croson severely  limits the  availability of
race-based  quotas  and  preferences).
38.  115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
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as to the  states,39 it went out of its way to make  clear  that  the  standard
would not lead  to automatic  invalidation,  that  outcomes  would  turn  on
particular  facts,'  and  thus  that  we  could  not  foresee  certain  results  in
future cases.
As a result,  there  is  still--eighteen  years  and  numerous  Supreme
Court  cases  after Bakke-a high  degree  of uncertainty  about  the  law
governing  affirmative  action.  The  public  reaction  to  Adarand shows
that a great deal  of doubt  about  whether  affirmative  action is  constitu-
tionally permissible  still remains."  Now,  as  before,  the  validity  of  an
affirmative action program  greatly depends  on the particular case.
What has the Court achieved?  Perhaps  the Court has  succeeded  in
invalidating  the most  indefensible  affirmative  action  plans  and  in  up-
holding  the most  legitimate.  This  would  certainly  be  the  optimist's
view.42  But if we step  back  a bit, we might  conclude  that the Court has
helped  keep  the  nation's  eye  on  the  affirmative  action  issue--on  the
questions  of policy  and  principle  that  lie  behind  the  debate-while  at
the same time failing to preempt processes  of public  discussion  and de-
bate.  Above all, the Court  has  done  this because  it has  decided  a large
number of cases, but proceeded in a highly  particularistic  manner.
V
AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION  AND PUBLIC  DEBATE
A.  The Constitutional  Attack on Affirmative Action
It seems reasonable to think  that the question  of affirmative  action
should be settled  democratically,  not judicially.  Despite frequent prot-
39.  Id. at 2117 (holding that all government-established  racial  classifications  must be analyzed
under the strict scrutiny standard of review).
40.  The Court wrote:
we wish to dispel the notion  that strict scrutiny  is  'strict  in theory, but fatal  in fact.'  The
unhappy persistence of both the practice  and  the lingering  effects  of racial  discrimination
against  minority groups  in this country  is  an  unfortunate  reality,  and  government  is  not
disqualified  from acting  in  response  to it....  When  race-based  action  is  necessary  to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies  the
'narrow tailoring'  test this Court has set out in previous cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
41.  Justice Department Memorandum on Supreme  Court's Adarand  Decision, 405  LABOR
RELATION S RPTR.: FAut  EMPLOYMENT  PRACrIcEs  MANUAL (BNA) 221 (June 28, 1995).
42.  I  do  not  believe  that this  view  is  correct.  The  affirmative  action  program  in  Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),  is probably the least defensible, but the Court actually
upheld it.  The Court said that the minority set-aside in the broadcasting  area  could be  defended  as a
way of ensuring that the minority community would receive broadcasting of its choice.  Id.  But-and
this is a central  point--there  was no requirement  that minority-owned  stations  provide  broadcasting
for minority communities.  The reason that there was  no such requirement  was  that it would,  on the
conventional view, violate the First Amendment.  Thus,  the Court upheld  the minority set-aside  as  a
proxy  (admittedly a very crude one) for an end that was generally believed unconstitutional.
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estations to the contrary,43 the Constitution  imposes  no  clear textual  ban
on  affirmative action.  In  fact, the textual arguments  are  laughably  in-
adequate.  To  be  sure, the Constitution  calls for "equal"  protection  of
the  laws; but this  point  is  uninformative  on  the  validity  of affirmative
action.'  The term  "equal"  cannot  possibly  mean  "the  same,"  if "the
same"  is intended to suggest a ban on all classification.  By their nature,
laws classify.  Even the law of equal protection  classifies.  Thus,  it is no
offense  to  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  if  courts  scrutinize  sex-based
classifications  more  skeptically  than  they  scrutinize  age-based  classifi-
cations--even  though this difference  does not treat people  "the  same."
The  question  is what the  word  "equal"  requires  in this  context.  Dic-
tionaries  are unhelpful  here.  The  only  way to make  progress  is  to  go
outside of the text;  we must look there  to find possible  understandings
of the Constitution's  equality principle.
Nor is it helpful  to  say  that the Constitution  speaks  of  "any  per-
son"  rather  than  of groups."  The  Supreme  Court, together  with many
scholars,  appears  to think that the reference  to  "any  person" means  that
the clause  speaks of individuals rather than of groups,  and that this point
counts  against affirmative  action.46  This  claim contains  some  truth, but
it is misleading.  To be sure, "any  person"  may  complain  that a classi-
fication  is  constitutionally  unacceptable.  But  on  what  grounds  can
"any  person"  seek special judicial  assistance?  Under the  Equal Protec-
tion Clause, all claims of unconstitutional  discrimination  are necessarily
based on complaints about treatment that singles out  a characteristic
shared by a group.  A glance  at the cases, or  at any  imaginable  set  of
cases, shows that anyone who  complains  of unconstitutional  discrimina-
tion  is  necessarily  complaining  about  the  government's  use, for  pur-
poses  of  classification,  of  some  characteristic  that  is  shared  by  some
number of group members.  The  question  is whether  the government's
use  of  that  shared  characteristic  is disfavored  from  the  constitutional
point of view.  There  is no  serious  question  about  whether the  charac-
teristics  of which  "any  person"  may  complain  are  shared  characteris-
tics;  of  course  they  are.  In  this  sense,  claims  of  unconstitutional
discrimination  are always group-based  claims, even  if they  are  made  by
''any  person."
43.  See, e.g.,  DAVID  P. CURRIE,  THE CONSTITUTION  OF THE UNITED  STATES:  A  PRIMER  FOR
THE  PEOPLE  58-61  (1988);  RICHARD  A.  EPSTEIN,  FORBIDDEN  GROUNDs:  THE  CASE  AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT  DISCRIrMtNATION  LAWS  395-437 (1992).
44.  See  CtURE, supra note 43, at 58-61.
45.  U.S.  CONsT.,  amend. XIV,  § 1.
46.  See  Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,  115 S.  Ct. 2097,  2111  (1995);  City of  Richmond v.
J.A.  Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion);  Regents  of the  Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 438  U.S.  265,  289-90  (Powell,  J.)  (1978);  see also EPSTEIN, supra note 43,  at  399-
405.
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For  example,  suppose  that Jones  has  been  denied  a  government
job.  As a  "person,"  she  has  a  right  to  make  a  complaint  under  the
Equal  Protection  Clause.  But everything  depends  on the  characteristic
on which  government  has  allegedly  seized.  For Jones  to claim height-
ened  scrutiny  under  the Equal Protection  Clause, she has to say  some-
thing  about  the  classification  that the  government  has  used;  and  she
must  say  that  the  classification  treats  her,  as a  member of a  certain
group, in a "suspect"  way.  Thus she has a claim to careful  scrutiny  of
laws disadvantaging her if those laws classify on the basis  of sex.  But if
she  invokes  another  characteristic,  she has  no  such  claim.  The  same
plaintiff Jones has  no right  to heightened judicial  scrutiny  if those  laws
classify on the basis of age.47  She is thus entitled to a degree  of scrutiny
corresponding  to the basis of the classification of which she complains.
In short,  almost all classifications  involve "groups."  The  issue is
whether  heightened  scrutiny  represents  the appropriate  standard  of re-
view for the particular classification  that the government  has used.  The
fact that the Constitution  refers  to "any  person"  is utterly  uninforma-
tive  regarding  whether  any  particular  foundation  for  classification
should, or does,  meet heightened  judicial  scrutiny.  The  Court's use  of
the constitutional  text  as a justification  for  heightened  scrutiny  is bad
formalism-the  pretense  that the legal  text resolves  the  question  when
the judgment must actually  be based  on other grounds.
If the text of the Constitution does not ban  affirmative  action,  what
of the Constitution's  history?  It might be tempting  to  say  that  it is  a
lesson  of  the  Civil War that  all  racial  classifications  are  unacceptable.
But the history  shows no  such particular understanding  on  the  part  of
those  who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.  On the contrary, it tends
to  suggest that affirmative  action  policies  were  regarded  as  legitimate.
The Reconstruction  Congress that approved the Fourteenth  Amendment
concurrently  enacted  a number  of race-specific  programs  for  African-
Americans.48  A substantial  debate  about  whether  such  programs  were
legitimate  occurred,  and  the people  who  controlled  Congress  after  the
Civil War concluded  that  they  were.  No  evidence  exists  in  the  Four-
teenth Amendment ratification  debates that  all race-conscious  programs
would be impermissible.49
History  need  not be decisive.  Perhaps  a  moral  argument  justifies
the Court  in reading  the  text  to ban  affirmative  action.  But  no  clear
moral  argument  requires  courts  to treat affirmative  action policies  with
47.  See  Massachusetts  Bd.  of  Retirement  v.  Murgia,  427  U.S.  307  (1976)  (holding  that
rationality review, rather than strict scrutiny, was the proper standard  for age-based  classifications).
48.  See  Eric  Schnapper,  Affirmative Action  and the Legislative  History of the  Fourteenth
Amendment, 71  VA.  L  REV. 753  (1985)  (discussing the legislative  history of  these  programs  with
emphasis  on the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau  Act).
49.  See ANDREW  KULL,  THE  COLOR-BLIND  CONSTITUTION  79 (1992).
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great skepticism.  Many critics of affirmative action claim that the moral
argument  lay  at the heart  of the  work of Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.,  and
others in the civil rights movements of the 1960s; ° but this is an  histori-
cal error.  Asked in  1965  whether it was "fair  to request  a multibillion-
dollar program of preferential  treatment for the Negro, or for  any  other
minority  group,"  King  flatly replied,  "I  do  indeed." 51  In  1966,  King
wrote,
It is impossible to create a formula for the future  which does  not
take  into  account  that  our  society  has  been  doing  something
special against the Negro for hundreds  of years.  How then  can
he be  absorbed  into  the mainstream  of  American  life  if we  do
not do  something  special for him  now,  in  order  to  balance  the
equation  and equip him to compete on a just and  equal basis?""
In fact,  King's  1964  book,  Why  We  Can't Wait, criticized the idea that
once African  Americans  had  been  granted  simple  equality  before  the
law, no further action should be taken.  He wrote,
On the surface, this appears  reasonable, but it is not realistic.  For
it is obvious  that if a man  is entered  at the  starting  line  in  a race
three  hundred  years  after another  man,  the  first  would  have  to
perform  some  impossible  feat in order  to catch  up  with  his fel-
low  runner. 53
The views of Martin Luther King, Jr., need not be  decisive.  Perhaps
a moral principle  of color-blindness  deserves  constitutional  recognition;
certainly this is so if it is the only  intelligible principle  behind  the con-
stitutional concern  for racial equality.  But we can identify an  alternative
moral  principle,  one  that has  actually  been responsible  for  most of the
movement for racial change  in America,  both  during  the  Civil War and
thereafter.  In  the area  of race, a large  target  of the  Civil War Amend-
ments  was the preexisting  system  of  racial  caste:  a  system  that  turned
the  highly  visible  and  morally  irrelevant  characteristic  of  race  into  a
systemic  basis for  second-class  citizenship.'  The  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment is best conceived  of as opposing  that caste  system.5 5  And  if this
represents the best conception  of the Fourteenth Amendment,  then there
is  nothing  fundamentally  illegitimate  about  affirmative  action  pro-
grams.5 6  Such programs are  designed to overcome  caste-like features  of
50.  See,  e.g.,  D1NESH  D'SouzA,  THE  END  OF  RACISM:  PRINCIPLES  FOR  A  MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY  (1995).
51.  ALEX  HALEY,  THE  PLAYBOY  INTERVIEWS  115  (Murray Fisher ed.,  1993).
52.  MARTIN  LUTHER  KINO,  JR.,  WHY WE  CAN'T WAIT  146 (1963).
53.  Id. at 147.
54.  I draw here from Cass R. Sunstein,  The Anticaste Principle, 92  MICH. L.  REV.  2410, 2429
(1994).
55.  See  Adarand  Constructors  Inc.  v.  Pena,  115  S.  Ct.  2097,  2120  (1995)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting); Sunstein, supra  note 54, at 2439.
56.  See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120  (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
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existing practice.  This does not mean that they are  a good  idea, as they
may  not have this effect.  It may be that  they  are  bad  on  grounds  of
policy  and  should  be rejected  in democratic  and  administrative  arenas.
But that possibility does not make them constitutionally  objectionable.
In fact, the Supreme Court has yet to provide  a clear explanation  of
the principle that requires  affirmative  action  programs  to be treated  so
skeptically.Y  Most of its argument  depends  on  a  false  claim  of  sym-
metry:  if  discrimination  against  African  Americans  is  presumptively
forbidden,  how can  discrimination  against  whites  be presumptively  le-
gitimate? 8  This question is anything but rhetorical.  It is no better than
the question,  if discrimination  on  the basis of sex  is  presumed  illegiti-
mate, how  can the  same not be true for discrimination  on  the  basis  of
age?  In  fact,  the anticaste  principle  helps  provide  an  answer to  both
questions,  and that  answer suggests  that different  forms  of discrimina-
tion are utterly different.  To  be  sure, the Court  has  referred  to  a set of
legitimate  concerns  about  affirmative  action  policies:  the  social  divi-
siveness  of affirmative  action, the ordinary moral irrelevance  of race, the
fact that race is  not chosen  voluntarily,  and  the possibility  that affirma-
tive  action  programs  will  stigmatize  their  intended  beneficiaries.  But
none  of  these  points  supports  a  convincing  constitutional  complaint
about affirmative  action. 59  Many  things that government  does  are  divi-
sive, yet they are not unconstitutional  for  that reason.  Many  character-
istics that are morally irrelevant,  and that are  not voluntarily  chosen,  are
used  by  government  as  classifying  devices;  consider  height,  strength,
and intelligence.  Affirmative  action  programs may  well stigmatize their
intended beneficiaries.  But the same is plausibly  true  for programs  that
benefit  children  of  alumni  or  people  from  underrepresented  regions,
and  those  programs  are  not,  because  of  their  stigmatizing  effects,  un-
constitutional  under the Fourteenth Amendment.
57.  There is a lurking concern in the cases  with interest-group  power.  See David A.  Strauss,
Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup.  Cr. REv. 1.  Undoubtedly, interest-group  power
does underlie some affirmative action programs.  But why should  this form of interest-group  victory
receive careful judicial scrutiny, while other forms do not?
Occasionally, the cases also suggest that racial classifications  produce social  division.  See,  e.g.,
City of Richmond  v.  J.A.  Croson  Co., 488  U.S.  469, 493  (1989)  (O'Connor, J.)  (plurality  opinion);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This may  well  be  true.  But
an  absence of affirmative  action programs  would  also  produce  social  division.  In  any  case,  many
government programs  appear to promote social division, and they are  not constitutionally  suspect  for
that reason.  Some examples  include veterans'  preference laws, laws supporting  public education,  as
well as laws supporting  art and culture.
58.  For an  egregious  example of such  false  symmetry,  see D'SOUZA,  supra note  50,  which
offers  no  argument  against  preferential  treatment  even  though preferential  treatment  is one of the
book's central  targets.
59.  See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
B.  Democratic Debate and Affirmative Action
These  remarks  certainly  do  not mean  that  affirmative  action  pro-
grams are a good idea.  The range of such programs  is very wide, and to
make a judgment on them, it is important to have a sense of their  variety
and of their consequences.  Such programs  include  relatively  uncontro-
versial efforts  to  increase  the pool  of  applicants  by  ensuring  that  the
candidates  are  diverse;  these efforts  are  certainly  race-conscious,  but at
the stage of recruitment rather than actual appointment.  It is hard to  see
why  such  efforts  are  objectionable.  Other  affirmative  action  programs
include  race  as a factor  among  many  others.  Still  other  programs  in-
clude rigid quota systems as well.  Some programs give a minor boost to
highly qualified  candidates,  and  some allow people  entry  into  programs
for which  they  are  ill-suited.  Evaluation  of such programs  should  de-
pend  partly  on  their  content  and  their  consequences,  and  the  term
"affirmative  action programs"  is far too  imprecise  to  speak  adequately
on that score.  Above all, We need to know how such programs are  oper-
ating in the real world.  Undoubtedly,  many affirmative  action programs
are successful  and perceived  as such.
It is  striking but true  that until the  very  recent past, the nation  had
yet to have a sustained  discussion  about  the  legitimacy  and  variety  of
affirmative  action  programs  and of possible  alternatives.'  When  Con-
gress  adopted the  1964  Civil Rights  Act, discrimination  against  African
Americans was of course  the central  focus  of the debate.6'  Affirmative
action programs  were in an embryonic  state and did not receive much, if
any,  consideration.62  The first important affirmative  action program  was
actually  adopted  by  Executive  Order. 63  The  proliferation  of such  pro-
grams at the national,  state, and  local  levels  has proceeded  without sus-
tained  attention  to  the  underlying  issues  of  principle  and  policy.
Whatever one thinks  about the legitimacy of affirmative  action,  this  lack
of deliberation  is quite disturbing.'
60.  See, e.g., Drew  S. Days III, Fullilove,  96 YALE  L  . 453 (1987).
61.  This is clear from both  the majority  and  the dissenting opinions  in United  Steelworkers  of
America  v. Weber,  443 U.S.  193  (1979).  The  dissenting  opinion  of Chief Justice  Burger  tries  to
argue  that there  was  an  explicit  judgment  to  forbid  race-conscious  programs  benefiting  African
Americans.  Id. at 216-19 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).  But the snippets in the history, taken  in context,
do notjustify that conclusion.  See RiCHARD  A. POSNER,  Tm  PROBLEMS  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  283-85
(1990)  (discussing Weber).
62.  The  debates  that  appear  to  involve  affirmative  action  actually  involved  (a)  federally
mandated  racial balance;  and (b) racially-motivated  actions against whites  without remedial  goals  as
in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273  (1976).
63.  See Exec. Order No.  11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65),  reprinted  in 42 U.S.C.  § 2000e  (West
1994).
64.  Cf. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE,  WHY  WE LOST THE ERA 68 (1986)  (discussing the phenomenon
of "decision by accretion").
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In  fact,  it is  plausible  to  think  that  some  of  the public  backlash
against affirmative  action  is attributable  to  the perception  that the rele-
vant programs  have never been debated and defended  publicly.  It is not
at all true  to  say,  as  many  do,  that  affirmative  action  programs  are  a
creation  of federal  courts;'  many  such  programs  have  their  origins  in
private decisions  or in  decisions  of politically  accountable  bodies.  But
the widespread  perception  that affirmative  action  programs  are  court-
generated  is illuminating  insofar as  it suggests  a belief  that  such  pro-
grams have not been ratified publicly.
C.  The Court as Catalyst  in Affirmative Action
We are now in a position to discuss the possible catalytic role of the
Supreme  Court insofar  as that role  bears  on  the  affirmative  action  de-
bate.  Suppose that it is agreed that the issue of affirmative  action should
be decided  democratically  rather than judicially-but  suppose,  too, that
institutions are operating in such a way  as to ensure that any  public  de-
cisions are taken  in  an unaccountable  way, and  are not really  a product
of democratic  judgments.  The  Supreme  Court's  meandering,  casuisti-
cal, rule-free path may well be a salutary  way of signaling  the existence
of large  questions  of policy  and  principle,  at least  with  constitutional
dimensions,  when those questions would otherwise receive far less atten-
tion than they deserve.  Hence, the participants  in Supreme  Court  cases
have become  familiar  "characters"  in  the  national  debate,  helping  to
frame discussion:  people like Bakke," Weber, 67 Johnson,68 minority  con-
struction  contractors, 9  and others.
Judicial  signaling  is especially  important  in a context  where  social
norms may have an adverse effect  on  open  public  discussion.  Suppose
that a policy  persists not because  people  are in favor  of it, but because
social  norms  prevent  people  from  voicing  their  complaints  publicly.
Suppose too that these complaints are widespread.  If this is  so,70  there  is
a democratic  problem that requires attention.  At least as a general  rule,
something  should be  done  to  ensure that the issue receives  public  con-
sideration.  Private actors  can  help  to  remedy  the situation.  We might
describe  as  "norm  entrepreneurs"  those people  who  try  to activate pri-
65.  See  D'SouzA,  supra note  50,  at  291  (claiming  that  "racial'  preferences  are  now
widespread in private sector job hiring").
66.  Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438  U.S. 265 (1978).
67.  United Steelworkers  of Am. v. weber, 443 U.S. 193  (1979).
68.  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
69.  Adarand  Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
70.  See KURAN,  supra note 3, at 138-41 (discussing the reasons  why people  do not voice  these
widespread  complaints).
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vate beliefs and judgments  in favor of a shift in  existing  social norms.
But  official  institutions  can  play  a role  as  well.  In  particular,  the  Su-
preme Court can signal the existence  of hard  questions  of political  mo-
rality  and public policy, by taking cases, drawing  public  attention  to the
underlying  questions,  and  refusing  to  issue  authoritative  pronounce-
ments.  And  if we examine  the Court's  practice  in the  area  of affirma-
tive action, we can see that the Court  has  operated  in precisely  this way.
It  has  helped  keep  the  affirmative  action  issue  in  the  public  domain
without  foreclosing  public  deliberation.  In  this  way,  the  Court  has
served  a valuable catalytic function.
I do not claim that the Court has been self-conscious  about its role.
But some of the justices, especially  Justices  O'Connor  and  Powell, have
undoubtedly  been aware of the difficulty  and  variety  of the affirmative
action problem and have chosen a casuistical  approach  for this reason. 7
Nor do I claim that the current public interest in affirmative  action  owes
its origin  to Supreme  Court decisions.  There  are  undoubtedly  a  wide
range  of factors  that could be  said to have played  a catalytic  role.  All I
contend  is that the Court's  decisions  have been  among  the factors  that
have both kept affirmative  action in the public eye and helped  focus  the
public  on  issues of principle  and  policy.  And  to the  extent  that those
effects have been salutary, the Court's  practice here  bears  on  other  me-
andering paths  in the past,3 and  also  on  future  practices,  perhaps  in the
area of discrimination  on the basis of sexual  orientation,  where  a degree
of casuistry also makes a good deal of sense.74
I cannot  offer here a full  discussion  of when casuistry  in the  inter-
est of public deliberation is a desirable strategy for the Court,75 but a  few
brief remarks  may  be  helpful.  The  casuistical  approach  makes  most
sense  when  the  Court  is uncertain  or  divided  about  whether  any  broad
rule  is constitutionally  sound.  It follows  that in  the  affirmative  action
context, the Court's approach is more attractive  to those  who  are unsure
about the constitutional status  of affirmative  action.  For those  who  be-
lieve that it is per se invalid, or clearly  acceptable  in  all circumstances,
71.  See  CASS  K  SUNSTmN,  FREE  MARMETS  AND  SOCIAL  JUSTICE  ch.  2 (forthcoming  1997);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social  Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM.  L  REv. 983 (1996).
72.  See Adarand, 115  S.  Ct.  at 2108-12;  Croson, 488  U.S.  at  509  (O'Connor,  J.)  (plurality
opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-320 (Powell, J.).
73.  The Court's  treatment  of federalism  provides  a  notable  example.  The  recent  decision  in
United States v. Lopez,  115  S.  Ct. 1624  (1995),  turned  on  a  set of factors-the  absence  of  clear
findings from Congress, the traditionally local nature of education, the  fact that the relevant  guns  did
not have to travel in interstate  commerce,  and the fact  that commercial  activity  was  not involved-
rather than a  lucid rule.  Whether  or not Lopez was  right,  it might be  taken as  a  salutary  signal  to
Congress  and  the nation that the Commerce  Clause  is  limited,  and  that  public  deliberation  should
attend to those limitations.
74.  See Cass  R. Sunstein,  Homosexuality and the  Constitution, 70  IND.  LJ.  1, 23-27  (1994)
(defending the view that a casuistic approach by the Court is appropriate in this area of the law).
75.  For more detail, see Sunstein, supra note 2.
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judicial casuistry  would  be harder  to defend.  Casuistry  will seem most
sensible to those  who  believe that the relevant  outcome  should  turn  on
particular facts.  In the affirmative  action  context,  we might think  that  a
rigid quota system is  worse than  "race  as a factor,"  or that universities
have special reasons to engage in race-conscious programs.
Equally  important,  the  argument  for  casuistry,  as  a  catalytic  ap-
proach,  is strengthened by a judgment that judicial  decisions  will in fact
spur, or at least be a healthy part  of, ongoing  processes  of public  delib-
eration.  The argument becomes even stronger if those processes  at least
have the potential  to function  well.  If this is so, judicial casuistry  may
promote, rather than undermine,  the system of democratic  deliberation.
If, on  the other  hand,  public  deliberation  is  unlikely  in  any  event, or
likely  to  operate  very  badly,  a more rule-bound  approach  to  the  Con-
stitution would be better.  Obviously there are  empirical  issues here  that
I have not resolved.
On these grounds,  we can see how the Court's  casuistical decisions,
defended  in  the  way I have  here,  might best be criticized.  Perhaps  the
Constitution  is  sensibly  interpreted  to  ban  all  affirmative  action  pro-
grams  (though  I have suggested  that this would be  a most  adventurous
reading).  Perhaps the Constitution  is best understood  not to  draw such
programs  into  question  at  all.  Or perhaps  democratic  processes  have
been  working  very  well  without  the Court,  and  the  Court's  decisions
have been marginally  relevant, or have even helped  to facilitate  distor-
tions  of democratic  deliberation.  I  do not believe this judgment  could
be supported,  but  it suggests the direction  in  which  a  challenge  to  the
Court's  approach  might move.  It suggests, too,  how judicial  casuistry
might be evaluated in the context of such issues as discrimination on  the
basis of sexual  orientation.  I believe, for  example,  that most such  dis-
crimination  is unacceptable  under  the Equal  Protection  Clause.  But  it
may  very  well make  sense  for the Court to proceed  slowly,  cautiously,
and in a case-specific way, because of the variety of possible settings, the
practical need to build on democratic  judgments,  and  the value of judi-
cial humility  in  the face  of so  controversial  a  public  issue,  one  that  is
now receiving considerable  public  attention.76
VI
AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION,  DELIBERATIVE  GOVERNMENT,  AND
THE  REFERENDUM
The  suggestion  that  the  Court  has  helped  catalyze  public  debate
should  not  by  any  means  be  taken  as  a  claim  that  with  respect  to
76.  Id.
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affirmative  action,  the democratic  process  has been  or  is  now  working
well.  With  "norm cascades"-large  shifts  in  current norms-there  is a
risk that outcomes  will be based on sensationalistic anecdotes,  on  factual
misperceptions,  or, worse, on  simple  racism  and hatred.  Undoubtedly,
objections  to  affirmative  action  programs  are  often  well-motivated;  it
would be  ludicrous  to think  that such  objections  are  necessarily  rooted
in racial prejudice.  But  appeals  to  racism, usually  tacit, are  a large part
of the debate.  Some  people  might  think  that  affirmative  action  is  an
unpromising  area for public  deliberation precisely  because of the  likeli-
hood  that racist motivations  will be at work.  If this is an  unpromising
area for public deliberation, the argument for a catalytic  effort  from  the
Court  is of course  weakened,  and judges  might  attempt  to  resolve  the
problem  on other  grounds.
The relevant risks are especially  severe  in the context  of a referen-
dum,  which  bypasses  ordinary  filters  of  political  representation  and
hence raises special risks.n  Referenda may well be based  on  inadequate
information  and  on popular  passions  that are  insufficiently  influenced
by reason-giving  and understanding  of context.7
'  This  was of course  a
relevant concern  in  the framing period.79
Much national attention  is now focused  on a referendum  proposal
in  California  designed  to  eliminate  preferential  treatment  based  on
race.8"  Political processes in California on this issue do not appear  to  be
deliberative.  The  American  system is one  of representative  rather than
direct  democracy,  partly  because  of a judgment  that political  delibera-
tion can be  best promoted  through a representative  system.8'  If judicial
decisions  stimulate poorly  functioning  referendum  processes,  little  will
be gained.
In the context  of affirmative  action  in particular,  there is  a danger
that referendum  outcomes  will not be  based  on  a careful  assessment of
facts and  values,  but instead  on  crude  "we-they"  thinking.  This  is  a
77.  See  JAMES  S.  FISHKIN,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DELIBERATION:  NEW  DIRECTION  FOR
DEMOCRATIC  REFORM (1991).
78.  Id. at 58-59.
79.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James  Madison).
80.  In 1996,  Californians  will  vote on the following  anti-affirmative  action amendment  to the
state constitution (dubbed by its supporters as the "California Civil Rights Initiative"):
Neither the State of California nor any of its political  subdivisions  or agents shall use race,
sex,  color, ethnicity,  or national  origin as  a criterion for either  discriminating  against,  or
granting  preferential  treatment  to, any individual  or group  in the  operation of the  State's
system of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
CALIFORNIA  CIVIL  RIGHTS  INITIATIVE,  reprinted in CALIFORNIA  SENATE  OFFICE  OF  RESEARCH,
THE  STATUS  OF AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION  IN  CALIFORNIA  (1995).
81.  See  THm FEDERALIST  No.  10, supra note  79; JOSEPH  M.  BESSETTE,  THE  MILD  VOICE  OF
REASON:  DELIBERATIVE  DEMOCRACY  AND  AMERICAN  NATIONAL  GOVERNMENT  (1994).
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danger in the context  of race.  It is not my purpose here  to  evaluate that
risk.  But if a catalytic  role from  the  Court  serves  to  intensify  poorly
functioning  majoritarian  processes,  that  role  may  be  nothing  to  cele-
brate.  Both  exercises  of  statesmanship  and  institutional  correctives-
displacing the referendum  process with  more  insulated bodies-may  be
in  order.  Hence,  it  is  appropriate  to  assemble  politically  insulated
groups  to  try  to  compile  information  about  the  actual  effects  of  af-
firmative  action  programs.83
Unfortunately,  it is unclear  whether  the  Supreme  Court  can  do  a
great deal to make  things  better.  Some  people have  suggested  that the
Court might  review the outcomes  of referenda  with an  unusually  high
degree  of skepticism.'  There is some  sense  in this  suggestion.  An  ap-
proach  of this kind can find structural support in the Constitution,  which
is rooted  in faith  in representation,  and  in the Constitution's  most fun-
damental  underlying  concerns.  It  is plausible  to  say  that  the  Court
should be mildly more receptive to a constitutional  challenge  when  leg-
islation has come through referenda.  But no  provision  of the Constitu-
tion  specifically  authorizes  judges  to regard  the  outcomes  of referenda
as less legitimate  than the outcomes  of representative  processes,  and  in
any  case it is not, under  current  law,  easy  to  see  how  someone  might
challenge  a ban on affirmative  action on these constitutional  grounds.85
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have tried  to  connect  two ideas.  The first  involves
the  disjunction  between  private  beliefs  and  public  statements-a  dis-
junction that stems from social norms that can  discourage  honest public
argument  about  public  issues  and  in that  way  undermine  values  that
animate  the First Amendment  itself.  The  second  involves  the  catalytic
82.  See, e.g.,  the amendment to the Colorado Constitution at issue in Romer  v. Evans,  114 U.S.
(1996),  which provides in pertinent part:
Neither the  State of Colorado,  through  any of its branches  or departments,  nor any  of its
agencies,  political  subdivisions,  municipalities  or  school  districts,  shall  enact,  adopt  or
enforce  any  statute,  regulation,  ordinance  or  policy  whereby  homosexual,  lesbian  or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices  or relationships  shall  constitute  or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim  any  minority  status, quota
preferences, protected  status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 1623 (quoting  Amend. 2 to COLO.  CONST.,  art. II,  § 2).  The  Supreme  Court struck down  the
amendment as unconstitutional  under the Equal Protection Clause.
83.  Cf.  STEPHEN  BREYER,  BREAKING  THE  VICIOUS  CIRCLE:  TOWARDS  EPFECTIVE  RISK
REGULATION  (1993) (discussing an institutional remedy  for regulatory failure, through increasing  the
power of specialists to allocate resources  in sensible ways).
84.  For  a  discussion  of these  suggestions,  see  Julian  N.  Eule,  Judicial Review  of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALE  L.J.  1503 (1990).
85.  After  Washington  v. Davis,  426 U.S.  229  (1976),  it is clear  that affirmative  action is not
required by  the Constitution except  in certain  narrow  circumstances,  such  as  when race-conscious
remedies are constitutionally required for remedial  purposes.  See Swann  v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.  1 (1971).
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animate the First Amendment  itself.  The  second  involves  the  catalytic
role of the Supreme  Court.  This  role is  ordinarily  thought  to  involve
three principal  powers:  validating  or invalidating  laws, and  refusing  to
hear  cases.  But the  Court  has  a  fourth  power-the  authority  to  issue
highly casuistical  rulings  that  do not  settle much, but that  operate  as  a
kind  of "remand"  to  the  public,  alerting  people  to  the  existence  of
hard  issues of principle  and  policy.  In  the  affirmative  action  context,
the Court, whether  or not  intentionally,  has  done  precisely  this.  It  has
said little that is authoritative.  It has, however,  helped  trigger public  de-
bate, with, perhaps, an understanding  on  the part  of some  of the Justices
that until recently, the debate was neither broadly inclusive  nor properly
deliberative-and  that it did  not  honestly  reflect  people's  underlying
concerns.  In other words, the Court  can be taken  to have  responded  to
the fact that social norms  have helped  prevent  open  public  discussion,
and to have tried  to promote such a discussion.
From these points, it would be possible to celebrate what many have
seen as the Court's indefensible  course  of rule-free  judgment.  Perhaps
the  Court  has  refused  to  foreclose  an  issue  on  which  the  political
branches  should  have the  final  say,  but  nonetheless  played  a valuable
role  in  ensuring  that the  political  branches  actually  give  the  issue the
attention that it warrants. Certainly, the Court's decisions have inspired  a
great  deal  of media  attention  and  placed  a kind  of public  spotlight  on
affirmative  action.
I think that ideas  of this  sort generally  support a degree of casuistry
in some areas of constitutional  law, and that casuistry  makes a  great deal
of sense in the context of hard issues  on  which the nation  is sharply  di-
vided.  But the approach  may  be too optimistic  in  the  particular context
of affirmative action.  If it is too  optimistic,  this  is so either because  af-
firmative  action is not problematic  from  the  standpoint  of policy  and
principle, or because  the political process,  realistically  speaking,  will not
be deliberative at all, but instead  will serve as a forum  for  sloganeering,
mutual suspicion,  and racial prejudice.
Neither  of these reservations  can be  easily  dismissed.  But in light
'of the wide range  of programs  labelled  "affirmative  action,"  the  first
reservation  seems  too  starkly  stated.  Even  those  who  approve  of af-
firmative action should recognize  that some programs  are unfair  and  do
not  fulfill  their  intended  purposes.  In  any  case,  a  public  discussion
would  serve  many  valuable  functions.  It  is  much  too  soon  to  know
whether  the second  reservation  is warranted.  But  it  does  seem  safe  to
say that the area of affirmative action casts a new light on the role  of the
Supreme Court.  It shows that the Court's catalytic  role  can  help  trigger
public debate and heretofore silent protest where debate might otherwise
be  absent.  From  the  standpoint  of  deliberative  democracy,  what  is
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catalyzed  may be nothing  to celebrate, at  least  in  the  context  of race.
But remedies for that large problem would take me well beyond  the pre-
sent discussion.